ISSN 2737-7504

School of Politics & International Relations
Working Paper Series: WP18/2019



Institutions, identities and ideals: ethno-national conflict, complex power-sharing, and consociational theory

Joseph Ruane, Geary Institute, UCD

Jennifer Todd, School of Politics & International Relations, University College Dublin

Institutions, identities and ideals: ethno-national conflict, complex power-sharing, and consociational theory. [1]

Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd

Abstract:

The increasing international use of power-sharing agreements to end conflicts and accommodate ethno-national opposition within a democratic frame has highlighted problems in power-sharing practice. It also shows problems in consociational theory. And it brings into focus the distinctive identity processes amongst state-centred populations who are at the heart of peace processes and central to the stability of power-sharing regimes, and whose identity trajectories have been little studied. Rather than consociationalism faltering because it freezes identities, as its critics say, it falters because it leads to change in them, and particularly so for state-centred groups. This article analyzes the dynamic interrelations between the functioning of power-sharing institutions, group identity processes and normative change in two relatively successful complex consociational regimes (Northern Ireland and the Republic of North Macedonia). It shows mechanisms whereby backsliding is likely to happen just when the consociational institutions have been stabilized, and how the resulting incremental institutional drift destabilizes the institutions to the point where radical intervention is needed to restore their momentum. It shows the asymmetric modes of identity construction and change amongst state-centred populations and amongst their challengers, and shows the particular trajectories and difficulty of change for the state-centred groups.

Key words: consociation, power-sharing, group identity processes, accommodation, Northern Ireland, Republic of North Macedonia, Good Friday Agreement, Ohrid Agreement.

Citation

This paper should be cited as Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd (2019) Identities, institutions and ideals: ethno-national conflict, complex power-sharing, and consociational theory, SPIRe Working Paper WP18, School of Politics and International Relations, UCD, Ireland.

[1] Thanks to Orli Schacter and Alan Hickey for excellent RA work, and UCD Research for initial funding for research assistance. Dawn Walsh, George Kyris, Kurt Bassanauer and participants at ISA San Francisco, to Bahar Rumelili, John Nagle and participants at the IR seminar in Koc university Istanbul and in the ECPR General Conference Wroclaw and particularly to Roland Gjoni.

Professor Joseph Ruane was Professor in the School of Sociology, UCC until 2010, Visiting Professor Sociology, UCD 2011- 2016, Visiting Fellow Geary Institute UCD, 2016-present and Emeritus Professor UCC. His research centres on religious minorities and the longue durée of conflict, with specific interest in France and Ireland, and on the Northern Ireland conflict and settlement. His publications include Ethnicity and Religion (Routledge 2010), articles and chapters and a forthcoming book on comparative Protestant minorities, and (with J. Todd) he is working on issues of conflict and settlement in Northern Ireland.
j.ruane@ucc.ie

Professor Jennifer Todd MRIA is Research Director, Institute for British Irish Studies, Fellow Geary Institute UCD, and Honorary Fellow, Centre for Constitutional Change, U Edinburgh, and until 2018 was Full Professor, SPIRe. She works on areas of identity, ethnicity and conflict/resolution, and has recently published books on Identity Change After Conflict (Springer/Palgrave 2018) and, with John Coakley, on Negotiating Settlement in Northern Ireland 1969-2019 (Oxford University Press, in press, publication date November 2019).
Jennifer.todd@ucd.ie

Identities, institutions and ideals: ethno-national conflict, complex power-sharing, and consociational theory.

Introduction

The increasing international use of power-sharing agreements to end conflicts and accommodate ethno-national opposition within a democratic frame has highlighted problems in power-sharing practice.[2] We argue that it also reveals problems in consociational theory (CT) – by far the most prominent and ambitious theorization and justification of one form of power sharing.[3] And it brings into focus the distinctive identity processes amongst state-centred populations who are at the heart of peace processes and central to the stability of power-sharing regimes, and whose identity trajectories have been little studied.[4] This article provides a theoretically informed explanation of recent reversals in power-sharing practice, that reveals flaws in consociational theory and shows distinctive identity patterns in state-centred groups.

The last decade has seen reversals even in some of the most well-designed cases of complex consociational power-sharing - in the Republic of North Macedonia (RONM) and in Northern Ireland[5] – showing an unexpected trajectory of political backsliding and institutional drift *after* it appeared that the consociational institutions were stably in place and functional. In each case, the process was driven by the state-centred population and its bloc parties, who came to accept the new order and then later turned against it. There has been little theoretically informed analysis why. The proximate causes of the problems, in particular external opportunities, are well recognized: but exogenous change is endemic, complex consociation is designed to cope with it, and contingent explanations do not explain the common patterns in the two cases. Moreover the trajectory is not simply a response to exogenous opportunity; it involves the more puzzling phenomenon of changed priorities amongst the state-centred parties and populations.

We provide a theoretically-informed explanation of the reversals of power-sharing in these cases that generates a revision of CT but not from the conventional critical perspective that consociational institutions 'freeze' identities (Taylor, 2009). Instead we show that they stimulate change in them, especially in the state-centred population, thus giving real potential for a democratic peace. But that change provokes instability and eventual backsliding in a 'concertina effect' that consociational concepts fail to recognize, consociational institutions fail to manage and consociational norms fail to guide.

After a short theoretical discussion of consociationalism and group identity processes we move to the substantive focus of the article, tracing the institutional trajectories of change in Northern Ireland and RONM, showing they were driven by asymmetric group identity processes, and offering a theoretically-informed explanation that focusses on the agents and timing of the process. We outline the theoretical and policy-related significance of our

[2] Since the beginning of the 1990s, over three quarters of negotiated agreements have involved some form of power-sharing, see Hartzell and Hoddie, 2017, 41. On the practical problems, see McGarry, 2017; Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; and Sisk, 2013.

[3] On contemporary complex consociational theory, see Wolff and Cordell, 2016; on its relation to other forms of power-sharing, see Jarstad, 2008.

[4] There is nothing equivalent to the major comparative study of once-dominated ('challenger') populations undertaken by Lamont et al (2016).

[5] Names are contentious. We use the official names even, in the case of RONM, in discussing earlier periods.

argument and in conclusion point to its wider implications for analysis of state-centred populations.

Consociational theory (CT)

Consociational theory, from its classic statement in the work of Arendt Lipjhart (1977) to the present, has been concerned to give typological descriptions of consociational power-sharing, to predict the conditions under which consociational institutions will be adopted and to explain their functioning (Wolff, nd). It has a strong policy-orientation, and consociationalists revise definitions, theory and policy on the basis of practical experience. Lustick (1997) argues that there is a methodological circularity in Lipjhart's work. But circles can be productive if they are large enough. We argue that CT's ontological assumptions are restrictive, and change in these allows a TC (a theory of consociations rather than a specific consociational theory) to develop progressive research and policy in a wide range of areas.

CT works from existing group divisions – ethno-religious or ethno-national groups in conflict and the parties that represent them - and analyses how power may viably and functionally be shared between their bloc parties. In the liberal forms of consociationalism with which we are concerned in this article, the divided groups are understood as self-defining, parties self-designate as bloc parties and people decide whether or not to vote for them (O'Leary, 2005). Consociational power-sharing then has four characteristics:

- executive powersharing: this does not require a 'grand' or total coalition, as long as each of the blocs is meaningfully represented in government (see discussion in McGarry and O'Leary, 2017).
- mutual vetoes : whereby parties in each bloc can stop policies imposed by another more powerful bloc or alliance (see McEvoy, 2013)
- proportionality: each main bloc is to be proportionally represented in government, and also in other spheres for example security, civil service, etc.
- segmental autonomy*:* The term, as Coakley (2009) argues, is misleading; it is generally understood to involve a set of provisions including group equality in key fields, institutional recognition of and protection for group identity, and acceptance of bloc parties.

Together these provide proportionality, parity and protection for existing groups in conflict. This is augmented in complex consociationalism which takes
seriously the many reasons nations, states and nationalisms are important to people.[6] It tackles ethno-national division and conflict across state borders, advocating consociational governance plus a series of arrangements for territorial self-governance, local autonomy, transborder institutions, common rights harmonized across regimes and/or constitutional guarantees of how future change would take place democratically (Wolff and Cordell, 2016; McGarry and O'Leary 2013; O'Leary, 2019, 1-32). This is designed to stabilize power-sharing even in the face of geopolitical change and internal power shift by providing guarantees of rights and equality across state boundaries.

[6] McGarry, 2017; McGarry and O'Leary, 2017.

This institutional configuration is guided by accommodationist norms (McGarry, O'Leary and Simeon, 2008) by which ethno-national groups are accepted as they are (or rather as the bloc parties they vote for define them) and their representatives are incorporated into every aspect of state institutions. Institutions are reformed to accommodate national identities, rather than to incentivize change in them.[7] This in turn is based on a social ontology of groupness: ethno-national group boundaries and group identities are deeply rooted, stable and non-negotiable, and it is 'idealistic' to think otherwise (McGarry and O'Leary, 2004,19-24; O'Leary, 2005, 4-10; McGarry et al, 2008, 73-8). They are 'resilient, durable and hard' (McGarry et al, 2008, 53), changing if at all only over the long term.

This ontology leaves CT ill-equipped to analyze dynamic processes of institutional, contextual, and micro-identity change. CT argues that ethnic identities are deep, enduring and need to be accommodated and it pays much more attention to the institutions of accommodation than to the identities themselves: they are treated as simple phenomena that in their form do not differ greatly one from another. But where identities are complex, contested and variable phenomena, the standardized consociational tool-box may have counter-intuitive effects. Proportionality, parity and protection are highly likely to challenge state-centred identities and to produce a dynamic interaction between identities, institutions and ideals that is increasingly recognized as central to institutional change.[8] We will argue below that the dys-functioning of complex consociational institutions is to be explained at least in part by the unanticipated group identity processes they set in motion.

Group identity processes and state-centred populations

By 'group identity' we mean the core interconnected and internally contested package of categories, values, narratives and beliefs associated with group-belonging: this is an expansive meaning-laden rather than a narrow categorical concept of group identity.[9] By 'group identity process' (GIP) we mean the changing weights of the different values, categories and beliefs associated with group membership, so that the balance of identification within the group changes. GIPs differ in their form (whether they involve primarily a change in category or in meaning and value, whether they involve an increase or decrease in the salience of the category) and in their directionality (the values that are prioritized, whether they are a movement to more or to less openness). In ethno-national relations, this is seldom a change from one nationality to another but rather between different ways of being national (Hutchinson, 2005).

[7] Here, particularly in party system and electoral design, is where centripetalists most disagree with consociationalists. See Horowitz, 1990; Reilly, 2001. Their point is that the party system inevitably shapes group definitions and has sticking power, that makes it hard for voters to change. Consociationalists, on the contrary believe that to achieve and stabilize such institutions requires 'organised mass parties with confident and secure leaders' (O'Leary, 2005, 28-33) that will represent group interests and identities, broker compromise and ensure political stability

[8] This is increasingly seen as central to institutional change, see Mahoney and Thelen, 2009; although this has only slowly been recognized in the study of conflict and peace-building, but see Ruane and Todd, 2007; Todd, 2014; Broschek et al, 2018 ; Toubeau, 2018 ; and Bogaards, 2019.

[9] For an overview of the different usages of 'identity' in political science and IR, see Rumelili and Todd, 2018. For discussion of the uses of different concepts of identity, and of the quite radical changes of meaning and boundaries, not categories, within each part of Ireland in the 2000s, see Todd, 2018.

The form and direction of identity change differs with the resources and opportunities and repertoires available to different subgroups, and is likely to be asymmetrical in conflict situations because the starting points, repertoires and points of reference differ between groups in conflict. They also differ within them, so that 'groupness', to use Brubaker's (2002) term, is highly contested and parcellated, partly constituted by competing projects carried forward by organizations and factions and parties, each offering competing definitions of the group's values and identity (see Lamont et al, 2016). In what follows, we do not dig deep to the individualized affective dimensions of identity studied by psychologists (self-esteem, esteem as group member, solidarity, etc; see Ashmore et al 2004) but rather inductively focus on the empirical patterns and logics of group identity – what beliefs, values and projects in the traditional identity package are emphasized, what left recessive, and what choices does this favour. This allows us to map the rationales of identity change in light of changing social structures and political opportunities.

We focus on state-centred populations – those who define themselves primarily by a state-centred, institutional reference point. They differ from populations who define themselves primarily in terms of values, meanings and linkages embedded in sub-state organizations and informal practices, as do many of the 'challenger' populations who resist state power. State-centred populations have a predominantly institution-centred identity, prioritizing the 'civic' values of the state over the specific values embodied in their daily practices and linkages. But states are also forms of exclusion, and state boundaries are power-resources which benefit some groups, providing easy alliances and organizational resources and valorizing their ideas, while dis-benefitting and disorganizing others (Lustick, 1993; Wimmer 2002; Poulantzas, 1968). For state-centred populations, this gives rise to a potent mix of interests, values and identity when the state is challenged.

There is relatively little theorization of state-centred identity groups. Castells (1977) distinguished 'legitimating' identities originating in state norms and ideologies from 'resistance' identities (often based on informal linkages and sub-political institutions) and from 'project' identities focused on future-oriented values. But he believed that legitimating identities were now residual and vanishing as state-hegemony and authority was increasingly questioned: on the contrary there is much evidence as to the continued vitality of these identities. Memmi (1965) showed how civic state-centredness is common between metropolitan liberals and settlers fighting at the colonial periphery, taking a different form because of the differential challenge (see also Wright, 1987). Abulof (2015), Rumelili (2015) and others trace how some state-centred identities are resistant to change not simply from interest but from ontological insecurity; their very identity is so connected to state-institutions, power and/or alliances that change threatens implosion. Lustick (1993) explores the ideological and military thresholds before the resistance of state-centred groups to state-downsizing is overcome. But these studies do not show the variation within and choices available to state-centred populations (see Todd 2005) nor how they contrast with challenger populations.

Most recent comparative empirical work has focused on challenger and stigmatized populations, showing, for example, the symbolic resources used in everyday struggles against inequality, discrimination and 'assaults on worth' (Lamont *et al.* 2016a). There is no comparable comparative research on how state-centred populations respond to political reform and equalization or on the cultural logics of identity change amongst them.

Complex consociational regimes provide a test case of the capacity of state-centred groups to accept and accommodate to state-reform towards proportionality and parity, and an experimental arena where we can see when they resist it and what in it they resist. In what follows we take an inductive approach asking (i) what are the patterns of identity change in the state-centred population and how far are they different from the challenger population (ii) what are the logics of change? (iii) what causal effects on power-sharing institutions, if any, does this identity change have?

Comparative patterns

Cases and questions

We choose two cases – Northern Ireland and the Republic of North Macedonia (RONM) – that are very similar in formal character. They are liberal and complex consociational democracies, with ethnic party systems, widely seen as amongst the most effective and successful cases of complex consociationalism (McEvoy, 2015). In both cases a consociational agreement has been in place for close to two decades. It ended violent ethno-national conflict but there remains ethno-national division with a state-centred population posed against a challenger population with strong kin-state linkages (see McEvoy, 2015; Gjoni 2019). In each case, these populations are compositely constructed on a multiplicity of dimensions (including descent, ethno-communal, national, religious, and even civilizational). In each case, the conflict over the form of regime and existence of the state was entwined with conflict over horizontal inequality (Ruane and Todd, 1996; Koinova 2013).

In other substantive respects, the cases are very different. Northern Ireland is a region of the United Kingdom, RONM has been an independent state since 1991. The cases differ in the historical form and depth of division, in their geopolitical context, economic structure, past experience of violence and extent of reform of horizontal inequality (Ruane and Todd, 2015; Koinova, 2013) and in the guarantors and brokers who oversaw agreement and its implementation (see McEvoy and McCulloch 2018).

They are, however, very similar in institutional trajectory and in GIPs. In each case, a negotiated agreement was with great difficulty reached between state-centred and challenger parties and it was opposed by significant sections of the state-centred bloc. A crisis-ridden period of implementation followed and finally – in large part due to insistence by guarantors – implementation of most of the provisions of agreement was finally achieved and a period of stable democratic functioning ensured. Then new problems emerged, driven by the main state-centred political party and population. This led to stalling of policy, institutional drift, significant weakening of the institutions and even, in the case of RONM, of democracy itself. This was more than a 'bumpy road' to be resolved by 'institutional tinkering' (McCulloch and McEvoy, 2018; McCulloch, 2017): it was a serious institutional crisis to resolve which – in RONM - required major concerted international and cross-community effort.

Our question is why this trajectory? Why did institutional problems emerge after the agreement was implemented and had functioned stably for some years? Why did they take the form of institutional drift? Why was the change driven by the state-centred population

which had previously accepted the new order, and by a state-centred party which had previously led it?

We use a qualitative process tracing method to identify the patterns of change.[10] In exploring the role of group identity processes that involve meanings and assumptions that are not always directly empirically accessible, we reconstruct the processes through seeking a reflexive equilibrium between theoretically plausible and powerful claims and empirical data.[11] In the next section we outline the phases and sequences of change, and in the subsequent we identify the common patterns of change and show the inadequacy of conventional explanations of them.[12]

Sequences:

Agreement

Northern Ireland, Good Friday Agreement (GFA) 1998; RONM, Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) 2001.

In each case the negotiated agreement changed the form of regime to allow strong and complex power-sharing across a wide range of fields, with proportionality, veto-powers, grand coalition and segmental autonomy of different forms, together with recognition and institutional expression of national difference (in the Northern Ireland case, involving transnational institutions) while giving guarantees that the state's existence would be protected (in the Northern Ireland case subject to the democratic will of the population).[13]

In each case, the agreement gained asymmetric support, with the state-centred parties divided and the challengers largely positive. Only one of the main state-centred unionist parties in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), participated in the negotiations, and it split over the final agreement; the other main party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) opposed negotiations and agreement. Just over half (57%) of Protestant voters approved the agreement in referendum in May 1998, as did the vast majority (93%) of Catholic voters in Northern Ireland, and – in a simultaneous referendum - the population of the Republic of Ireland (Hayes and McAllister, 2007). Ethnic Macedonian parties approved the agreement only under strong international pressure (see McEvoy, 2015, pp). It was not put to referendum, but Gromes' overview of existing surveys shows that the majority of Albanians accepted it and a bare majority of ethnic Macedonians rejected it (Gromes 2009, pp. 10, 15-16, 20).

[10] Sisk 2013 has argued for detailed process-tracing studies of a few comparative cases to discover the mechanisms of functioning/dysfunctioning: comparison allows us to move beyond contingent events to find common mechanisms and processes.

[11] Bates et al, 1998, refer to this as the construction of 'analytic narratives'.

[12] There is a much more extensive literature, including survey research, on Northern Ireland than on RONM, and our empirical evidence is richer in the former than in the latter.

[13] Rather than outline the provisions of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in Northern Ireland and the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) in RONM, we refer readers to the excellent accounts in McEvoy, 2015, Koinova, 2014, McGarry and O'Leary, 2004, and O'Leary, 2019, vol. 3., 175-229. For works emphasizing particular aspects of the OFA, see Daskalovski, 2002; Georgieva et al, 2011; Koneska, 2012; Lyon, 2011; 2012; Koktsidis, 2013; Vasilev, 2011.

Implementation
Northern Ireland 1998-2006; RONM 2001-2005

In each case, implementation proceeded through a series of crises and a fall-off in support by the state-centred population.

In Northern Ireland, there was a succession of crises caused by commitment problems: without the decommissioning of IRA arms, unionists were unwilling to share power with republicans; without unionist commitment to the proposed reforms, republicans were unwilling to decommission. The power-sharing executive functioned for only 19 months in the 9 years between June 1998 and May 2007 and IRA decommissioning was finally achieved only in 2005. During this period there was a marked drop off in support for the Agreement amongst the state centred population– by 2003 only 28% of the Protestant population (and still 74% of the Catholic) said that they would vote for the GFA if the referendum was held again. In the 2003 elections, the DUP triumphed over the more moderate UUP, and Sinn Féin over the more moderate SDLP. But while support for the agreement fell, the state-centred population moderated in its political attitudes, even on the most contentious issues. Now a clear majority would be willing to accept a united Ireland achieved democratically: the percentage of Protestant die-hards unwilling to accept this had declined very significantly by 2004 (see Figure 1). Attempts to mobilize Protestants against aspects of the Agreement using symbolically resonant themes (Victims groups, the 'Love Ulster' campaign) failed; only a few thousand attended a 'Love Ulster' march in Belfast in 2005 and soon the campaign petered out (Nagle, 2009) After the decommissioning of IRA weapons and other reforms, the once-extreme DUP entered a new power-sharing executive with the once-extreme Sinn Féin amidst plurality approval by unionists; by 2007 58% of the Protestant population thought the GFA had been a good thing. [14]



[14] 2007 data from NILT, GFAFORNI. In 2006, when asked how they would vote in a referendum on St Andrews 39% of Protestants said they would vote yes and only 15% no, with close to a third of the population undecided NILT 2006 VOTESTA.

Figure 1: changing percentage of Protestant unionist die-hards, swayers and changers. [15]
Sources: Northern Ireland Life and Times surveys; Rose, 1971; Coopers and Lybrand, 1988.

In RONM there were also crises of implementation, in particular over Albanian language education and local self-government (see Lyon, 2011; 2012 ; Koinova, 2013, 173-4). The insistence on these reforms by the international community was widely perceived as unfair by ethnic Macedonians, even the liberal ones (Koinova, 2013, p194 ; Neofostistos 2010 889) and there was a slight fall off in support for the OFA (Gromes, 2009). However, there was also evidence of a moderation of attitudes on the part of the ethnic Macedonian population. In 2004, VMRO called a referendum against the implementation of local autonomy in ethnic Albanian areas, a key provision of the OFA, but participation was very low, signalling a growing acceptance of the new regime. Even the once-extreme parties accepted the Ohrid Framework. VMRO-DPMNE remodeled itself as technocratic, centre-right, pro-OFA, pro-EU party. Implementation proceeded and the EU granted candidate status to RONM in 2005

During the implementation period, acceptance of the consociational institutions increased amongst the challenger population. In Northern Ireland, nationalist diehards, who could never accept the British connection, were a tiny proportion (3%) of the Catholic population, and increasing numbers came to prefer the new devolved regime to a united Ireland (see Figure 2). In RONM, Albanian irredentism declined and acceptance and positive feeling for the Macedonian state increased (Gromes, 2009, 16, 21) .

[15] The question was 'If response to **NIRELND2** is not 'To reunify with the rest of Ireland'
If the majority of people in Northern Ireland ever voted to become part of a United Ireland do you think you ... [i] would find this almost impossible to accept; [ii] would not like it, but could live with it if you had to; or, [iii] would happily accept the wishes of the majority?; [iv] don't know.' We label the first 'diehards', the second 'swayers' and the third 'changers'.



Figure 2. Preferences among Catholic population (Northern Ireland) to remain in the United Kingdom
Sources: Northern Ireland Social Attitudes and Life and Times surveys. Rose, 1971; Moxon Browne, 1978.

Stabilizing consociational democracy.
Northern Ireland 2007-2012; RONM 2005-2008

There followed a period of stable functioning of the consociational institutions when the state-centred population and parties, as well as the challengers, came to accept the agreement.

In Northern Ireland, a period of stable government, moderation of party policies and of public attitudes ensued (Mitchell et al, 2009). Continuing points of conflict within the executive, for example over the devolution of policing in 2010, were eased by a major British financial package (McEvoy, 2015 pp). Democratic devolved politics appeared to be working smoothly in the Assembly and in local government (Conley, 2013; O'Connor, 2013; O'Leary 2019). The DUP maintained its bloc dominance against more extreme parties. Nationalists in Northern Ireland increasingly came to accept the present constitutional arrangement within the United Kingdom, while unionist die-hards, who could never accept a united Ireland, stayed below 20% of the Protestant population (figures 1 and 2). Politics appeared 'normalized', with a significant fall-off in electoral participation.[16]

In RONM, reforms proceeded sufficiently far that it was admitted to candidate status by the EU in 2005. In 2006, VMRO-DPMNE - now presenting as a modernizing technocratic centre-right party - won an election on its economic programme and on its reputation for efficiency, rather than on nationalist grounds (Crowther, 2017). The splinter hardline ethnic Macedonian party, VMRO-NP, won only 6% of the vote. Gromes (2009,) notes that 'The number of people in favor of the Framework Agreement was never higher than when

[16] From 70% in 1998 to 62% in 2007 to 56% in 2011.

the new government came to power.'[17] But ethnic Macedonians remained uneasy: while 70% of the Albanians in Macedonia believed that the Ohrid Agreement provided a good long-term solution for Macedonia's ethnic problems, only 30% of Macedonians agreed.[18]

Reversal, institutional drift, crisis and resolution.
Northern Ireland 2013-2019; RONM 2008-2017

Stable power sharing lasted for only three years in RONM and for five years in Northern Ireland before the tide turned within one of the major bloc parties. This was more than a re-composition of the political bloc, it was a reversal of the previous political trajectory by those who had once led it. In each case the reversal was triggered by exogenous change which emboldened hardliners from the state-centred group who were still embedded in key social and political positions (Koinova, 2013 182). Increasingly they won popular support.

In each case, institutional drift occurred; the institutions remained in place, the rules and norms continued to be referred to, but they now functioned differently – or not at all - and the guarantors did not intervene.[19] Meanwhile the state-centred population's attitudes and preferences became more hardline, justified by a reinterpretation of accommodationalist norms: respect for identity was taken to justify retention of ethnically-weighted state symbolism and institutional practices. There began a new feedback loop between hardening popular preferences, party-political policies and changing institutional functioning. Meanwhile the weakening of the institutions heightened the impact of exogenous change.[20] Crisis finally developed, taking a different form, with differing outcome in each case.

In Northern Ireland, the advent of a new, increasingly sovereigntist British Conservative government from 2010, together with a weakened Irish state after the economic crash of 2008, changed the resources in the intra-unionist struggle. Hardliners were no longer arguing against the tide and attempted to harness inchoate popular unease by affirming classic British sovereignty over Northern Ireland. Their opportunities were increased by a new British-Irish policy (announced in 2012) which no longer focused primarily on Northern Ireland but expected the devolved government to sort out its own conflicts (Todd 2017).

A popular unionist 'flags' protest (2012-3) against Belfast City Council's decision to reduce the number of days that the British flag was flown over City Hall was the first sign of popular reversal; its leaders justified it as 'ordinary people simply expressing their cultural identity', and, unlike earlier protests, it won the support of about half of the Protestant

[17] 59% of citizens supported the agreement, only 28% rejected it (IRI 2008: slide 9). Positive feeling about the EU was also high.
[18] (Balkan Monitor, 2008, 10).
[19] On 'drift' see Hacker et al, 2015; in RONM, see Koinova, 2013, 183-5, 201-2; in Northern Ireland, see Todd, 2017.
[20] For example, had the power-sharing institutions in Northern Ireland been working well up to 2016, it is likely that the main parties would have negotiated an shared stance with respect to Brexit which would have maximized their impact and influence, rather than allow the question radically to split the executive, and increasingly to polarize the population.

population.[21] The DUP hardened its policies and by 2013, the power-sharing executive was deadlocked: even policy decisions that had already been agreed and for which EU funding had been secured were reversed by the DUP.[22] By 2014, unionist public opinion had become more extreme, with die-hards now a third of the population (see figure 1). International mediation failed, the British and Irish governments did not intervene until the crisis was full-blown, then brokered two further agreements in 2014 and 2015 which failed to restore any momentum (Todd 2017; O'Leary 2019 269-282). The UK-wide referendum on Brexit in 2016 further divided the population: 56% of the Northern Ireland population voted to remain in the EU, but 60% of Protestants voted to leave, led by the DUP. Brexit threatened to undermine key provisions of the GFA and this, with the chance to harden the Irish border and make a united Ireland less likely, appealed to the hardliners in the DUP and let them marginalize the other factions (Murphy and Evershed, 2019). Polarization increased as the DUP entered a 'confidence and supply' agreement with the minority Conservative government, itself increasingly unionist and sovereigntist, and unionist political rhetoric became virulently dismissive of nationalism.

In 2008, a Greek veto on NATO membership changed the opportunity structure in RONM. It was now less likely that it would quickly be accepted into the EU or NATO. The hardliners within VMRO-DPMNE were strengthened and Gruevski saw his opportunity to win massive public support in a snap election called and fought on a nationalist platform. Identity assertion was central to the new politics - *Skopje 2014* highlighted the ethnic Macedonian nature of the state. Even if the initial popular motivation was anti-Greek rather than anti-ethnic-Albanian (Spaskovska, 2012), the impact on OFA was major, for it involved symbolic rejection of any ethnic Albanian ownership of the state and of public space.[23]

The ensuing 9 years followed the letter but not the spirit of the OFA. This was indeed stable government but it functioned not to share power but rather to parcel out offices and state jobs between the parties, delegating local Albanian affairs to the DUI, while keeping the direction of state policy and symbolism as the preserve of VMRO. (Gjoni and DiGuardia, 2014; Crowther, 2017). Rather than calling halt, in 2011 the EU, US, and NATO issued a joint statement praising the country's progress in becoming 'a stable, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and inter-religious society' (McEvoy, 2015, 202). The result was a 'dismantling of opposition, corruption, suppression of media, corrupt judiciary' (Gjoni and Di Guardia, 2014. See also Crowther, 2017; Koinova 2013) and some fall off in political participation (Daskalovski, 2014). The extent of corruption became evident after the 2015-6 release of tapes showing 'state capture affecting the functioning of democratic institutions and key areas of society'.[24] Symbolic of the hardening of popular views between 2008-2017, support for the EU decreased and this was directly interrelated with the symbolic assertion of identity: EU and NATO membership would require continued reform and name-change

[21] See Nolan et al, 2014, 52, 64, 73.
[22] See Nolan 2014, and O'Leary 2019, vol 3, 258-282
[23]Ethnic Albanians were free to express their identity through language and increasingly flags, but only in their own local areas, not in central public space which was defined as Macedonian. See Koinova, 2013, 189
[24] The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Report: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia.pdf. Quoting from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-3634_en.htm

to accommodate Greece, and this prospect radically split the populations and increasingly the ethnic Macedonian parties.[25]

Only after major mobilization, and with Albanian state and strong international support, was the governing party ousted and a new government elected in 2017 which promised to restore the momentum of the consociational institutions and the OFA (see Stefanowski, 2017; Bassanauer, 2018). This in turn provoked a new wave of opposition, this time focused on the renewed push to resolve the 'name' question. A large section of the state-centred population saw the 2018 Prespa Agreement with Greece as, in the words of the President, 'historical suicide'.[26]

Patterns

In each case there was a difficult and crisis-ridden period of achieving, accepting and implementing agreement, during which the state-centred population was deeply divided on its merits. When eventually the agreement was institutionalized there was a period of relatively successful consociational government, backed by voters: far from being 'failed' or 'neo-trustee' states, where crises are never overcome, there was popular democratic ownership of agreement. At this point there was a period of stalling of institutions and institutional drift which made the institutions crisis-prone, requiring major intervention to restore institutional functioning.

In each case the process of institutional drift was driven by the state-centred population and its main party. The process was asymmetric: the challenger population and parties remained fully in support of the agreement.
In each society, the state-centred population sequentially moderated then again hardened its position. Ethnic Macedonians were always uneasy about the OFA, but this unease was countered both by pragmatism and by a sense of civic patriotism (Nancheva, 2013152-5, 285). The relative weights they gave these motivations varied radically over time: in 2006 a large majority rejected hardline politics, in 2008 a large majority embraced it and by 2018 the population was very deeply divided not just on strategy but also on identity.[27] In Northern Ireland, where divisions within the Protestant population were fluid and intensely fought, over a quarter were committed to the GFA, and only a sixth consistently against it, while the rest swayed over time. As institutional drift occurred, hardline attitudes increased amongst the state-centred population; only much later did the challengers begin slowly to harden their views.

[25] USAID, 2017, 52 ; Eurothink, 2019, slide 4. The decrease in support was primarily among the ethnic Macedonian population. In 2013, when asked if they would approve EU membership with a change of name, two thirds of ethnic Albanians approved, while two thirds of ethnic Macedonians disapproved, and in 2018, 90% of ethnic Albanians and among ethnic Macedonians, over three quarters of SDSM supporters, and only 10% of VMRO supporters (ICDS May 2018 pp., 12-13, 29)

[26] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45699749 . Resistance had not, by Sept 2019, derailed the process.

[27] Close to a third of VMRO supporters (and less than 10% of SDSM) believed that any constitutional change would affect their identity, over a third of SDSM supporters (and less than 10% of VMRO) believed that constitutional change would not at all affect their identity (ICSDS, 2018, p. 26).

The pattern is puzzling for the threat to the state did not increase. On the contrary, once power-sharing was stabilized, objective threats to the existence of the state became weaker and more indeterminate. There was power-shift: slow demographic change, a decrease in horizontal inequality, an increasing influence of kin states. But this increased the challengers' acceptance of the state and thus was a force for stabilization (Gjoni, 2019; Coakley and Todd, 2019). With reform, there was a decrease in the *relative* economic and political position of the state-centred group, but the best chance for economic development lay in the new order.

Nor was it a matter of hardline populations or bad leaders or bad neighbours or bad institutions.[28] There had been significant moderation of policies and preferences within the state-centred populations and parties before the reversal occurred, and 'neighbours' were not significantly more malevolent than before. Nor was the problem a fatal flaw in complex consociational design. That design was good enough to get the agreement functioning stably for a number of years, in itself a major achievement.

There was geo-political change but in neither case did it amount to a calamitous exogenous shock: the question is why these geo-political opportunities were taken up by the state-centred parties and populations when other more cooperative responses were easily available to them. There are of course contingent explanations that differ in each case. But these do not explain the common patterns. We are forced, therefore, back to consider the GIPs in each case.

Explaining reversal

The agents: Group Identity Processes in the state-centred population

State-centred populations are vulnerable to fission. The consociational shared state, characterized by proportionality, parity and protection, removes the reference point on which the population can unite, bringing to the fore their internal divisions, forcing them to choose between conflicting imperatives and incentives. They can either resist the change, try to make the best of the situation despite their unease, or emphasize other values, beliefs and sources of identity (see Todd, 2005). The situation for challenger populations is quite different, for the unreformed state forces them into internally divisive choices between assimilation, resistance and privatization while the new shared state is welcomed by them all, with differences on aims and strategy pushed into the future.

In both cases studied here, the state-centred population was initially a disparate alliance brought together only through the state. In Northern Ireland, unionists had long been divided between a more localistic, solidaristic, religious-identifying 'loyalist' cluster with conditional loyalty to the British state, and a more liberal, progressive, 'Ulster British' cluster who identified at once with the British state and with the progressive values it was held to embody (Todd, 1987; McAuley 2010). The Union-state was the sole uniting reference point for the different clusters of unionists – without it they fell back on a plurality of complex, stranded, value-laden particular identities. Ethnic Macedonians –

[28] The main explanations for conflict – or breakdown of agreement – given by Michael E. Brown 1996.

according to Danforth (1993) and Nancheva (2013) - worked with competing ethnic origin narratives, and with internally-conflicting discursive tropes, emphasizing both the national descent group at the base of the state *and* the tolerant interethnic relations within the state. But for all, their very identity as Macedonian was interrelated with state-hood.

After agreement, new identity options emerged and the state-centred populations divided in their choices, depending on their resources, opportunities, and initial position:

- Die-hard reaffirmers of the old identity existed but as a decreasing minority in both RONM and in Northern Ireland.[29]
- Privatizers opted out of the dominant ethno-national divisions, and they were relatively few.[30] But there was significant fall off from group solidarity especially as the institutions were put in place – for example, in elections in Northern Ireland, and in abstention in the 2004 referendum in RONM.
- Some ethnicized and moved to an ethnic egalitarian perspective. Gardner ( ) describes this option for a small number of Ulster Scots identifiers in Northern Ireland.[31]
- More moved to a positive acceptance of the shared state, and a commitment to its furtherance.[32] This stance has long been evident among business and higher professionals in Northern Ireland (see for example Ben Porat, 2006 ; Hayward and Maginess 2014 ; Ruane and Todd 2017). Nancheva (2013) argues it was also evident in Macedonian discourse, although it only became an important popular phenomenon there after 2017.
- By far the most popular choice, however, was to retain the old identity configuration and pragmatically adapt, seeking compromise and accommodation, precisely the stance encouraged by consociationalist norms.[33] This was a highly unstable position, for logically the state-centred identity cannot accommodate the opposition to the (old) state by challengers. Its unease at the changes in the state is augmented by its unease at the potential disintegration of the old state-centred alliance. At the limit, the old identity threatens to implode, the very definition of ontological insecurity.

We represent the GIP of the state-centred population diagrammatically in Figure 4 below.

[29] As figure 1 shows, they fell to between 14-20% of the Protestant population in Northern Ireland, less likely to be educated, more likely to be young and urban dwelling, than other clusters.

[30] See Todd (2018, 128-9) who estimates that there were no more than 10 % consistent privatizers in Northern Ireland in the 2000s: partial privatisers, for example who distanced from union*ism* but not from the union as a constitutional preference, were much more prevalent; Neofostistos (2012, 65-8) shows a similar phenomenon of situational privatization in RONM.

[31] While information on RONM is less clear, it is possible that the third of SDSM supporters who – in 2018 – felt no threat to their identity under any conditions fall into this category. (ICSDS, 2018)

[32] Surveys show that between a quarter and a third of the Protestant population gave committed support to the GFA: the percentage is smaller for ethnic Macedonian support for the OFA.

[33] About half of the Protestant population in Northern Ireland are 'swayers' (see figure 1) and more in RONM.



Before agreement after agreement

Figure 4: Identity clusters in the state-centred population:

In contrast, the challengers have little identity unease with the new regime – rather it confirms the worth of their previous struggle. They affirm their place in the new shared state or develop longer-term project identities which envisage wider transformative change, or simply privatize. Each subset differs in their long-term goals and often in party political preferences, but in the short term they are united in support for the regime and for parity of esteem and cultural respect.



Before agreement After agreement

Figure 5: Identity clusters in the challenger population

Adding to the unease among the state-centred population is a relative decline in its economic and social position: in the RONM, for example, it had lost economic security with the fall of communism and had lost status with the OFA, without yet gaining the promised

economic dividend of EU membership (see for example Neofostistos 2010, 889). When this coincides with identity anxieties, it forms a potent mix, easily mobilizable by die-hards.[34] But in both cases the relative economic decline was longer-term and preceded agreement, stabilization, and reversal. It adds to identity concerns, but does not explain the change in tack.

The timing

Why does stabilization of the consociational regime prove so challenging to sections of the state-centred population? Three factors coincide at this time:

First, as physical insecurity and uncertainty end, identity concerns come into prominence.

Second, the full implications of agreement become clear. There is ongoing symbolic change in the state, incipient splintering of group unity, an increasing presence and assertion by the challengers, and for many no change in their material position. It becomes increasingly clear that their old state centred identity and identity alliances will not thrive in the new regime.

Third, guarantors tend to back off once implementation is complete. Thus there is increasing opportunity for the state-centred population to assert their own concerns without fear of sanction.

This conjuncture of identity processes and power shift is augmented by exogenous events - the NATO veto, Conservative ideological shift in Britain – which embolden the die-hards. But there will always be exogenous change and there will always be die-hards, looking for opportunities. These endemic factors become important because of the endogenous identity processes set in motion by the consociational agreement that provide a constituency that is now ready to listen to the die-hards.

As it becomes clear that their constituents are uneasy, the state-centred parties allow the institutions to drift, redefining expectations and converting the meaning of the rules until the sharedness of the state is undermined. Close clientelist linkages between increasingly-mobilized sectors of the state-centred population and its bloc party help marginalize those still committed to a shared state (Nolan et al, 2014 ; Crowther, 2017). This is a gradual process of drift, for the change of mind of population and of party members is slow – they may have little appetite for the agreement, but neither do they want to collapse it.

As institutional drift occurs, however, it strengthens the group identity processes, seeming to prove that: 'power sharing is just dividing up the spoils', 'there is just division, no real sharing of the state or society', 'no-one has changed', 'there is no need to change or compromise because outside actors will not enforce change'. Thus the feedback patterns between geopolitical context, institutional change and endogenous group identity dynamics are tightened in a negative way.

It could have been different. The backsliding is a product of the partial success of consociational institutions in producing some identity change and its partial failure in not

[34] The 'adaptive' cluster is cross-class, but at least in Northern Ireland weighted towards the less well off.

producing more. The lack of normative ambition about group identity allows the identity concerns of large sections of the state-centred population to fester, while the accommodationalist norms give ideological resources to hardliners who argue that they too have a right to protect their state-centred identity. The way forward requires a break from this sense of state entitlement – clear statement of better alternative projects that can win swayers to the new order.

Theoretical significance

The patterns that we find in these two cases may not be typical. That they are extant at all shows the need to bring identity logics into political analysis and shows the need to revise key aspects of consociational theory, building group identity processes into its social ontology and normative foundations.

We have shown the asymmetric group identity processes amongst state-centred and challenger groups. This challenges a key 'pluralist' assumption of consociational theory, that identities are to be accommodated as they are (McGarry et al, 2008). Challenger identities are relatively adaptable to new institutional configurations and confirmed in more egalitarian ones; state-centred identities are brittle in these circumstances. Accommodationalist norms, which profess respect for all identities, ring hollow for the state-centred population who sense that they have to change in the very form of their identity if any accommodation is to be possible.

But, far from freezing identities, as the critics of consociationalism claim, consociational institutions provoked a distinctive identity trajectory in the state-centred population. Without appropriate cultural resources, norms, and institutional opportunities to incentivize more change among more of the state-centred population, a concertina effect occurs: a fall off of solidarity and allegiance amongst the state centred group, especially those with resources and opportunities to do so; followed by backsliding and a return to polarization amongst the majority of the population; leading if opportunities later emerge to a new phase of openness and then further backsliding. This pattern has been recurrent in the North-east of Ireland for at least a century and a half, and there are clear signs of the same pattern in RONM. In both cases, significant moderation in the policy preferences and attitudes of the state-centred population did not produce a stable equilibrium, but rather unease. Only a more ambitious normative framework of reform, which points to the cultural and normative benefits of change away from an institution-centred to a project-centred approach, will give the signposts necessary for larger sections of the state-centred population willingly to embrace change.

We traced a slow and partially contingent process by which ontological insecurity become widespread. For these state-centred populations, it was an ever-present possibility, but also one that was overcome by those clusters who changed. Its effects were slow-moving even for those clusters most vulnerable to it. That it impacted just as other political and security problems were resolved is significant. In these cases at least, it shows that if issues of cultural and normative policy are left 'until later', it may well be too late.

The concepts of consociational theory insufficiently grasp this identity dynamic and some of its policy recommendations are too rigid. Practically, given ongoing group identity processes, there can be no apriori reason to rule out power-sharing institutions that incentivize identity change: whether power-sharing should be centripetal or consociational in form is a matter of practicality and viability not of paradigmatic choice.[35] This leads us to three simple but important policy recommendations.

First, that guarantors should be vigilant and act quickly so that there are clear incentives – for public and parties – not to follow through on these polarizing processes. The period when consociational institutions are stabilized is particularly dangerous because it provokes a new phase of discontent amongst the state-centred group, just at the time when guarantors are tempted to step back.

Second, that a more ambitious normative orientation is needed to guide reflexive group identity change. Pluralist accommodation should not be treated as a value in itself but as a path towards more important norms (centred around recognition, autonomy and responsibility) that offer an alternative pathway for state-centred populations, and counter the trend to ontological insecurity.

Third, that there be gradually increasing provision for democratic deliberation in consociational regimes. Strong bloc parties can disguise the institutional drift that gradually subverts consociational functioning. Power-sharing regimes have an urgent need for public democratic participation and monitoring as early warning systems against drift.

Do these recommendations undermine the very viability of power-sharing which, according to Hartzell and Hoddie (2015) depends on limited democracy? Not necessarily. The optimal balance of leadership and participation differs in the negotiation and implementation phases of a consociational agreement (when leadership is essential) and when it has been institutionalized and put to work (when accountability is a priority). Closer attention to phasing allows a flexible and sequential institution of more democratic accountability over time (for example in the form of regular forums, commissions, citizens' assemblies).

Conclusion

In both Northern Ireland and the Republic of North Macedonia, even well-designed complex consociational institutions were vulnerable to endogenous group identity processes that they themselves helped set in motion. We have argued that a renewed theory of consociations needs to revise its assumptions and broaden its concepts, recognizing the asymmetry of identity of the populations with which it deals, the time-

[35] This point is also made by Cochrane et al, 2018, in their argument for flexibilism in response to problems in institutional functioning.

dependent character of their compliance or resistance, and thus the need for flexible institutional development.

Our analysis focused on the specific identity trajectories of state-centred populations and the feedback patterns between institutions, identities and ideals. Our case studies were of once-dominant state-centred majority populations in divided societies. In these cases change occurs as a response to pragmatic necessity and it is stalled and later reversed when inappropriate normative signposts are given, and when the wider authorities to whom these populations are attuned permit a restoration of the old symbolic order. One may expect backsliding to be less prevalent amongst minority state-centred populations, more dependent on the power-sharing rules for protection, but this demands requires systematic study. Whether the patterns found here are common to majority state-centred populations in societies like the UK and the USA, who want to defend *their* state and *their* identities within it in the face of greater inclusion, is an urgent question for study.

References

Abulof, U. (2015) *The Mortality and Morality of Nations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ashmore, R.D., Deaux, K., and McLaughlin-Volpe, T. (2004) 'An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality,' *Psychological Bulletin,* 130(1), 80-114

Bassuener, K (2018) 'Democratic reform in Macedonia: a happy ending is possible' – *Cable* 9 March

Bates, R. H., Greif, A., Levi, M., Rosenthal, J-L., and Weingast, B. R. (1998) *Analytic Narratives,* New Jersey: Princeton University Press

Ben Porat, G. (2006) *Global Liberalism, Local Populism. Peace and Conflict in Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland* U Syracuse Press

Bogaards, M. (2019) Formal and Informal Consociational Institutions: A Comparison of the National Pact and the Taif Agreement in Lebanon, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 25:1, 27-42, DOI: 10.1080/13537113.2019.1565176

Broschek, J., Petersohn, B. and Toubeau, S. (2018) 'Territorial Politics and Institutional Change:A Comparative-Historical Analysis' *Publius:TheJournal of Federalism* volume 48 number1, 1- 25

Brown, M. E. (1996) *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*. Cambridge Ma, MIT Press.

Brubaker, R. (2002) 'Ethnicity without groups', *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, xlii.2, 163-189.

Castells, M. (1977) *The Power of Identity, The Information Age,* Vol. 2, Oxford: Blackwell.

Coakley, J. (2009) 'Implementing Consociation in Northern Ireland', pp. 122-145 in R. Taylor (ed.) Consociational Theory: McGarry and O'Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict. London: Routledge.

Coakley, J. and Todd, J. (2019 in press) Negotiating Settlement in Northern Ireland 1969-2019. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Cochrane, F., Loizides, N. and Bodson, T. (2018) *Mediating Power-sharing: Devolution and Consociationalism in Deeply Divided Societies*. London: Routledge.

Crowther, W. (2017) 'Ethnic condominium and illiberalism in Macedonia', *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*, 31.4, 739-761

Danforth, L. M. (1993) Claims to Macedonian Identity: The Macedonian Question and the Break-Up of Yugoslavia. *Anthropology Today*, 9.4 3-10

Daskalovski, Z. (2002), 'Language and Identity: The Ohrid Framework Agreement and Liberal Notions of Citizenship and Nationality in Macedonia' *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 1, 2-32

Daskalovski, Z. (2014) The 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in Macedonia: More of the Same. Election analysis. Contemporary Southeastern Europe, 1 (2), 88-93

Eurothink (2019) Indifferent Optimism: public reactions to the initiatives aimed at unblocking the euro-integration process. Eurothink: Center for European Strategies

Gardner, P. R. (2018) 'Ethnicizing Ulster's Protestants?: Ulster-Scots education in Northern Ireland', *Identities*, 25:4, 397-416.

Georgieva, L., Memeti, A., Musliu, A. (2011) 'Patterns of Conflict Resolution in Macedonia', *IBIS discussion papers*, no8, www.ucd.ie/ibis/publications accessed 17 October 2017

Gjoni, R. (2019) *The dilemmas of kin states: a comparative study of partition politics in Albania and Ireland*. PhD thesis, University College Dublin

Gjoni, R. and DioGuardi, S. C. (2014) 'Brewing Crisis in Macedonia', Open Security: Conflict and Peace Building September 23 *Open Democracy*, https://opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/roland-gjoni-shirley-cloyes-dioguardi/crisis-brewing-in-macedonia accessed 19 March 2018

Hacker, J. S. Pierson, P and Thelen, K (2015) 'Drift and conversion: hidden faces of institutional change' 180-208 in J. Mahoney and K. Thelen, eds, *Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis*. Cambridge UP

Hartzell C.A. and Hoddie M (2015) 'The art of the possible: power sharing and post civil war democracy' *World Politics* 67, no. 1 (January 2015), 37–71

Hayes, B. C, and McAllister, I. (2007) 'Who voted for peace? Public support for the 1998 Northern Ireland agreement' *Irish political studies*, 2001 vol 16.1, 73-93.

Hayward, K., and Magennis, E. (2014) 'The business of building peace: Private Sector Cooperation across the Irish Border', *Irish Political Studies*, 22(1), 154- 175.

Hayward, K. and McManus, C. (2019) 'Neither/nor: The rejection of unionist and nationalist identities in post-agreement Northern Ireland' Capital and Class, 43.1, 139-155

Horowitz, D. L. (1990) 'Comparing Democratic Systems', *Journal of Democracy*, 1 (4), 73-79

Hutchinson, J. (2005). *Nations as Zones of Conflict,* London: Sage.

ICSDS (Institute for Democracy, Skopje) and MCIC (Macedonian Centre for International Cooperation)(2018) 'The Name Dispute: Public Views in Macedonia, 2018', authors Klekovski, S., Mihailovska, J, Jovanov, M., ISBN 978-608-4848-08-0

International Crisis Group (2011). Macedonia: Ten Years after the Conflict. Europe Report no 212 11 August 2011, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/balkans/macedonia/212%20Macedonia%20---%20Ten%20Years%20after%20the%20Conflict Accessed 17 October 2014

IRI (International Republican Institute) (2008) Macedonia 2008. Survey conducted in 2008, by BRIMA, under the supervision of D. Williams, Williams and Associates, Salem, Mass. power point report (document in the possession of the authors)

Jarstad, A. K. (2008) 'Dilemmas of war-to-democracy transitions: theories and concepts', pp. 17-36 in Jarstad and Sisk, eds, *From War to Democracy.*

Jarstad, A.K. and Sisk, T. J. (2008) *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Koinova, M. (2013) *Ethnonationalist Conflict in Postcommunist States: Varieties of Governance in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Kosovo*. Philadelphia, U Penn Press

Koktsidis, P. I. (2013) Nipping an Insurgency in the Bud—Part II: The Success and Limits of Non-military Coercion in FYR Macedonia, *Ethnopolitics:*, 12:3, 290-306,

Koneska, C (2012). 'Vetoes, Ethnic Bidding, Decentralisation: Post-Conflict Education in Macedonia'. *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 11, 4. 28-50

Lamont, M., Moraes Silva, G., Welburn, J., Guetzkow, J., Mizrachi, N., Herzog, H., and Reis, E. (2016a) *Getting Respect: Responding to Stigmatization and Discrimination,* Princeton: Princeton University Press

Lipjhart, A. (1977) *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lustick, I. S. (1993) *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands*, London and Ithaca: Columbia University Press.

Lustick, I. S. (1997) 'Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism', *World Politics*, 50 (1), 88-117.

Lyon, A. (2012). 'Between the Integration and Accomodation of Ethnic Difference: Decentralization in the Republic of Macedonia'. *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 11, 5. 80-103

Lyon, A. (2011) Municipal Decentralisation: Between the Integration and Accommodation of Ethnic Difference in the Republic of Macedonia 86-105 in

McCulloch, A. (2017) Pathways from Power-sharing, *Civil Wars*, 19:4, 405-424,

McCulloch, A. and McEvoy, J. (2018): 'Bumps in the Road Ahead': How External Actors Defuse Power-Sharing Crises', *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, DOI: 10.1080/17502977.2018.1526994

McEvoy, J (2015) *Powersharing Executives: Governing in Bosnia, Macedonia and Northern Ireland*. Philadelphia: U Penn Press

McEvoy, J. (2013) 'We Forbid! The mutual veto and power-sharing democracy', pp 253-277 in J. McEvoy and B. O'Leary, eds, *Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places*. U Penn Press

McEvoy, J. and McCulloch, A. (2018) 'The International Mediation of power-sharing settlements' *Cooperation and Conflict* 53 (4) 467-485

McGarry, J. (2017) 'Conclusion: What explains the performance of power-sharing settlements', pp 268-292 in A McCulloch and J McGarry, *Power-Sharing: Empirical and Normative Challenges*. London Routledge

McGarry, J., and O'Leary, B. (2004) *Consociational Engagements*, Oxford: OUP.

McGarry, J., O'Leary, B. and R. Simeon (2008) 'Integration or accommodation? The enduring debate inconflict regulation' pp 41-88 Sujit Choudhry ed, *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accomodation*? Oxford UP

McGarry, J. and O'Leary, B. (2013) Introduction, pp 1-32 in T. J. Mabry, J. McGarry, M. Moore and B. O'Leary, eds., *Divided Nations and European Integration*, Philadelphia: UPenn Press

McGarry, J. and O'Leary, B. (2017) 'Power-sharing executives: consociational and centripetal formulae and the case of Northern Ireland', pp 63-88 in A McCulloch and J McGarry, *Power-Sharing: Empirical and Normative Challenges*. London Routledge

Mahoney, J. and Thelen, K. (eds.) (2009) *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Memmi, A. (1965) *The Colonizer and the Colonized*,

Mitchell, P., Evans, G., and O'Leary, B. (2009) 'Extremist outbidding in ethnic party systems is not inevitable: Tribune parties in Northern Ireland', *Political Studies*, 57(2), pp. 397-421.

Nagle, J. (2009) 'The Ulster Unionist Victims' Movement: political opportunities and injustice masterframes' *Irish Journal of Sociology* 17.1 19-37

Nancheva, N. (2013) 'Transforming Identities in Europe. Bulgaria and Macedonia between nationalism and Europeanization' PhD thesis, University of Westminster

Neofostistos, V. (2010) 'Postsocialism, Social Value, and Identity Politics among Albanians in Macedonia' *Slavic Review*, Vol. 69, No. 4,. 882-902.

Neofostistos, V. (2012) *The Risk of War: Everyday Sociality in the Republic of Macedonia*. Philadelphia: UPenn Press

Nolan, P. (2014) *Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report. Number Three,* Belfast: Community Relations Council.

Nolan, P., Bryan, D., Dwyer, C., Hayward, K., Radford, K., and Shirlow, P., 'The Flag Dispute: Anatomy of a protest' Queen's University Belfast Institute for the Study of conflict Transformation and social Justice, http://pure.qub.ac.uk/portal/files/13748797/The_Flag_Dispute_report_PRINTED.pdf

O'Leary, B. (2005) 'Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory arguments', 3-43 in Sid Noel ed. *From Power-Sharing to Democracy. Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies*. Montreal: McGill university Press

O'Leary, B. (2019) *A Treatise on Northern Ireland*. Vol 3. Oxford: Oxford UP

Poulantzas, N. (1968) *Political Power and Social Classes*. Verso

Reilly, B. (2001) *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ruane, J. and Todd, J. (1996) *Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Ruane, J. and Todd, J. (2015) 'Multiple layers and multiple temporalities in conflicts and conflict settlements: Basque Country, Macedonia and Northern Ireland'. In: Bosi, N., O Dochartaigh, N., Pisou, D (eds). *Political Violence in Context* (ECPR Press) 43-66

Ruane, J. and Todd, J. (2017) 'Elite formation, the professions, business and the middle class' In: E Biagini, E. and Daly, M. (eds) *Cambridge Social History of Modern Ireland*, *1740 to Present* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Rumelili, B. (2015) 'Ontological (In)security and Peace Anxieties: A Framework for Conflict Resolution', in Rumelili, B., ed. *Conflict Resolution and Ontological Security: Peace Anxieties*, London and New York: Routledge, 10-29.

Rumelili, B., and Todd, J. (2018) 'Paradoxes of identity-change: Integrating macro, meso and micro research on identity in conflict processes', *Politics,* 38.1

Sisk, T. D. (2013) 'Power-Sharing in Civil War: Puzzles of Peacemaking and Peacebuilding', *Civil Wars*, 15:sup1, 7-20,

Spaskovska, L. (2012) 'The fractured 'we' and the ethno-national 'I': the Macedonian citizenship framework', *Citizenship Studies* 16. 3-4, 383-396

Stefanoski, D (2017) What the hell is going on in Macedonia? *Open Democracy*,

Taylor, R., ed. (2009) *Consociational Theory: McGarry and O'Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict*, Oxon: Routledge

Todd, J. (1987) "Two Traditions in Unionist Political Culture", *Irish Political Studies*, vol 2, pp. 1-26..

Todd, J. (2017) 'Contested Constitutionalism? Northern Ireland and the British-Irish relationship since 2010', *Parliamentary Affairs,* 70(2), 301-321.

Todd, J. (2018) *Identity Change after Conflict: Ethnicity, Boundaries and Belonging in the Two Irelands.* Switzerland: Springer/Palgrave..

Tonge, J., Braniff, M., Hennessey, T., McAuley, J. W., and Whiting, S. A. (2014) *The Democratic Unionist Party: From Protest to Power*, Oxford: OUP

Toubeau, S. (2018) 'Restructuring the State: Mainstream Responses to Regional Nationalism' *Publius:TheJournal of Federalism* volume 48 number1, 76-101

USAID, (2017) Public Opinion in Macedonia Aug 4-21 2017. Center For Insights in Survey Research

Vasilev, G. (2011) 'EU Conditionality and Ethnic Coexistence in the Balkans: Macedonia and Bosnia in a Comparative Perspective' *Ethnopolitics*, 10(1): 51-76.

Wimmer, A. (2002) *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity* Cambridge, Cambridge UP

Wolff, S. (nd) 'A Consociational theory of conflict management' http://stefanwolff.com/files/ConsociationalTheoryPaper.pdf

Wolff, S. and Cordell, K. (2016) 'Consociationalism' pp 289-300 in K. Cordell and S. Wolff, eds, *The Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*. Second Edition. London: Routledge

Wright, F. (1987) *Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis*. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan